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MORALITY AND WAR

ETHICS, MORALITY, AND THE GULF
WAR
GORDON C. ZAHN*

I.

First, some preliminaries.
A good case could be made, I suppose, that the three subjects
noted in the title have at best a remote relationship to each other.
Though to speak of an "ethics of war" may not yet be the oxymoron "morality of war" has become, it is well on the way. The rise of
the nation-state, with its insistence upon absolute priority for its
self-defined interests, has all but eliminated the prospect of developing and adhering to an objective, content-neutral formula for
distinguishing "right" from "wrong" in international relations.
Of course the idea that such a formula should be employed
might be a sociological intrusion ("fetish" perhaps?) rejected by
ethicists and moralists alike. Even so, the starting point for this
discussion is the presumption that the study of ethics (and morality as well) must be related to observable human behavior as a directive or restraining force and, at the same time, its product. Removed from that context, the attempt to codify and apply rules of
universal application is reduced to an exercise in intellectual abstraction comparable to game theory and other more esoteric spe* Professor Emeritus (Sociology), University of Massachusetts-Boston. Ph.D. 1952,
Catholic University of America. Professor Zahn has written a number of books, including
German Catholics and Hitler's Wars. He is co-founder of Pax Christi U.S.A. and the Center
on Conscience & War and serves as Vice-Chair of the National Interreligious Service Board
for Conscientious Objectors. He served in Civilian Public Service as a conscientious objector
to World War II.
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cialties of higher mathematics. This is not to say it has no significance nor even possibility of practical application-after all, it was
an equation that ultimately destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki-but it no longer serves as an effective source of controls or
standards directly affecting and explaining the actual behavior of
individuals in their social interactions.
Because it is the task of sociology to analyze, interpret,
and-where possible-even predict patterns of human behavior in
societies, ethics and morality can provide the key to the values motivating that behavior and, it follows, are a legitimate concern of
the sociologist. To insist upon this as a significant area of overlap
and mutual interest is not a reversion to the admittedly exaggerated claim of the early days of the discipline to being the "Queen"
(in the regal sense, of course) of the social sciences. It is, instead,
to state the obvious: in every actual social interaction, the actors'
behavior is an expression of the values operative at every stage of
that interaction-the actual values whether or not they are the
values professed. The possibility of discrepancy between the two, it
should be unnecessary to note, presents crucial problems for any
analysis of the "ethics" or "morality" of war.
These problems are intensified by a special complication arising from the terminology frequently employed by ethicists. Sociology, dealing as it does with matters of seemingly common everyday
behavior, places special emphasis upon making distinctions and expressing them as precisely as possible. This has led to an insistence
upon using familiar terms in tightly restricted ways or, often
enough, the creation of new terms (the much-ridiculed "jargon") to
assure that precision. In this Essay, then, I shall avoid the lamentable practice of ethicists to employ the terms "moral" and "ethical" as interchangeable concepts. I am fully aware that the practice
finds justification and support in dictionary definitions, but for
purposes here a distinction will be made between moral ethics and
secular ethics.
Part of the blame for the presumed equivalence may be traced
to one of the revered "founders" of the discipline of sociology, William Graham Sumner.' Sumner, despite (or, because of?) his earlier training for the ministry, rigorously rejected any religious concepts or implications in his treatment of "folkways" and "mores"
and made both, in effect, categories of "secular ethics." "Folkways"
1
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are the socially acceptable or expected forms of behavior; the "mores" are socially required behaviors in that they are considered essential to maintain the welfare and stability of society itself. Departures from the former, i.e., in diet, dress, or etiquette, might be
dismissed as eccentricities and possible occasions for ridicule; violations of the "mores," on the other hand, are serious acts of deviance subject to severe sanctions, including ostracism and exile.
Even death.
Because these cultural expectations and requirements are the
products of a society's experiences transmitted to its members*
through the processes of socialization, the secular ethics are "content-neutral" in the sense that there is no "outside" superior
power or universal source by which they can be judged. Moral ethics, by contrast, usually rest upon supernatural values made known
through some form of revelation. Secular ethics as a result are
more subject to change. This is certainly the case with the "folkways," but even the more binding "mores" will respond, though
slowly, to major societal changes or events. In matters of fashion,
for instance, one is no longer shocked to see women wearing men's
clothing (though male cross-dressing still may present some difficulties). Practices that once were condemned as serious violations
of the "mores" but that have become acceptable or at least tolerated-e.g., pre-marital and extra-marital sexual behavior, the practice of abortion-are usually characterized as "moral decline," but
actually are more properly described as a redefinition of outmoded
secular ethics. Moral ethics change too, of course; these changes
usually take much longer, require evidence of "official" validation,
and almost certainly provoke serious internal controversy (often a
lasting schism) within the religious community involved.
Content-neutrality does not require the secular ethicist to be
relativist in the analysis or interpretation of the behavior observed.
It does, however, call for an effort to maintain a measure of objectivity to assure consideration of that behavior in the context of the
prevailing secular ethic in the society under study before making
favorable or unfavorable evaluations or comparisons. The ethicist's
judgment may-and almost certainly will-be colored by his or her
own ethical values (regarding a practice like cannibalism, for example), but scholarly integrity would insist that this be made clear.
Equally important is avoiding the temptation to reify and personalize abstractions ("nation," "state") to the point of overlooking
the fact that it is always the social actors, the human beings en-
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gaged in patterned behavior, who should be the focus of critical
reference and analysis.
This distinction is lost too often and much too easily in dealing with war and military activity, sometimes by the participants
themselves. One recalls the many memoirs and staff reports written by generals and even lesser officers in a style that personalized
military action by speaking of countering an enemy assault upon
"my left flank" by attacking "his [the opposing general's]
strength". Political leaders, too, often speak in terms of personal
involvements and possessives in their declarations of public policy.
A recent example of especially poor taste was the statement of the
President of the United States reducing the Gulf War action to his
desire to "kick Saddam's ass." 2 Unfortunately the men (and increasingly women) of the armed forces whose lives are put at risk
as the General's "left flank" or the President's foot end up being
treated as depersonalized tokens in a game over which they have
no control.
None of what has been said in these preliminaries to the more
focused discussion of the ethics (and the morality) of the Gulf War
should be taken as an effort to minimize the importance of such
analyses. A detached and generalized search for limits and balances in human behavior relating to war and military action is not
only a laudable pursuit but also increasingly essential to future existence and must continue. It is crucial, however, that the objective
be kept in mind. The "nation" (or, more properly, the "society")
does not exist apart from its members whose interactions give it
meaning and sustain its purpose. Those who for whatever reason
are invested with the power to make decisions for the whole (and
ethicist/scholars who later will judge those decisions) fail in their
responsibility if they do not give priority to the needs and wellbeing of those who constitute that whole. War, especially modern
war, threatens both, no matter how favorable its prognosis and
beneficial its purpose may appear. The Gulf War and its aftermath
(if it is even proper to speak of "aftermath") of tragedy and failure
provide ample and tragic verification of that threat.
II.
It may seem inconsistent with what has been said thus far to
turn to the traditional "just war" theory and its conditions as the
2
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framework for developing a secular ethics critique of the Gulf War.
This approach, identified with the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and other "mainstream" Christian communions, might
be deemed more appropriate to a moral ethics evaluation; this will
be touched upon in Part III of this discussion. The argument here
is that just war theory is, in fact, more secular than moral in its
origin and application and, therefore, has little or no intrinsic relevance to the specifically Christian belief systems upon which most
such analyses are purportedly based.
The early Church made no provision for the justification of
any form of violence, not even as resistance or retaliation to the
persecutions directed against it and its members. Christian leaders,
especially the honored "Fathers of the Church," strongly and consistently condemned war and military service. Whatever weakening
there may have been in adherence to their teachings, this attitude
represented the "official" teaching until the introduction of the
Augustinian concessions under which Christians were permitted
(and later encouraged) to serve in the armed forces of the Empire
as good and loyal citizens. The "Age of Martyrs" had come to its
end-except, of course, for later echoes when new martyrs, including pacifist Christians rejected as "heretics," perished in wars
blessed by Christian leaders over the succeeding centuries of Christian history up to and including our own.
Ronald Musto, in his comprehensive history of Catholic peace
traditions, contends that "[t]he theory of the just war is not Christian in any proper sense of the word; it has no biblical, theological,
or canonical foundation; it is the product of secular and ecclesiastical pressures during the Middle Ages."' This finds more recent and
surprisingly strong support in a July 1991 editorial in La Civilta
Cattolica, an influential Jesuit periodical published in Rome.
(Added significance lies in the fact that its editorials are regularly
reviewed in advance by the Vatican Secretariat of State!) The editorial describes the "just war" theory as a rule-of-thumb formulated by theologians which "never became 'official,' [and was]
'4
never, therefore, sanctioned by the church's teaching authority."
The theory, as adapted by Augustine and, in effect, baptized
by later Scholastic and neo-Scholastic theologians, is a codification
of principles taken from ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, in
3 RONALD C, MusTo, Tim CATHOLIC PEACE TRADITION 104 (1986).
4 CATH. HERALD, July

11, 1991 (official journal of Archdiocese of Milwaukee).
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particular the ethics of Aristotle. It is, therefore, a system of secular, not moral, ethics-essentially the ethics of "the good pagan"-derived from philosophical inferences concerning the unwritten laws governing human nature.
In its more systematic development, the theory presents a
number of conditions bearing upon the origin and conduct of war
that must be met for a war to be considered "just." In a previously
published article written more from a moral ethics approach, I argued that all, or almost all, of the required conditions were violated by the Gulf War, the judgment of Mr. Bush and a number of
5
distinguished Christian leaders to the contrary notwithstanding.
Shifting here to a secular ethics emphasis, though some slight
modification will be in order, I see no need to revise that
conclusion.
Ideally one would look to the professional ethicist for the more
definitive analysis and interpretation that the issue requires, but,
like their theologian counterparts (though perhaps not as thoroughgoing in their disregard), specialists in the field of secular ethics seldom undertake the systematic ex post facto evaluations of
actual wars once they have been fought. In presenting this admittedly nonprofessional substitute, I will follow the general pattern
of discussing each of the conditions separately, though in a somewhat different clustering than the standard division into "ad bellum" (relating to the nature of the war) and "in bello" (relating to
its conduct) conditions. Instead, the perspective will focus upon (a)
conditions resting upon the self-interests of the parties to the dispute as defined by them; (b) conditions in which this self-interest
perspective is supplemented to a limited extent by the judgment of
outsiders; and, finally, (c) conditions in which external judgments
dominate and could possibly, though not often, control.
The first set consists of the conditions "just cause" and "right
intention." Though in the process of analysis both will be filtered
through the judgment of the ethicist, they focus on the subjective
perception of those who made the decision to initiate hostilities or
respond in kind once they have begun.
History may provide instances where rulers chose to instigate
wars they regarded as unjust while offering no pretense of justification, but such cases are probably rare. Even Hitler could and did
"make a case" for his aggressions, first as rectification of the injusI See

Zahn, supra note 2, at 367-68.
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tices of the Versailles treaty and then, once the major powers began to prepare to oppose those aggressions, as necessary to regain
and defend Germany's right to "a place in the sun."' Within that
general context he also advanced "justifications" for the Third
Reich's euthanasia program (the need to eliminate a drain on wartime finances and resources); the forced-labor policy (to replace
the manpower lost to combat duties); and, far-fetched though it
may have been, even the "Final Solution" (removing a threat to
the purity and resolve of the Aryan race in its momentous struggle
for survival). In Hitler's distorted perception (and that of his large
and enthusiastic following), the foregoing "justifications" met the
test of "just cause."
In the Gulf War too, each side proclaimed and almost certainly believed in the justice of its cause. Saddam Hussein saw the
invasion of Kuwait as necessary to stop (and penalize) Iraq's small
neighbor's exploitation of oil reserves claimed by Iraq and, in the
process, to gain disputed territory considered essential to Iraq's national and economic security. A more remote (and ultimate) goal
was the "restoration" of the greater Moslem nation of the past that
Iraq claimed to represent. For its part, the United States and the
"coalition" it created set out to rectify the violation of international order represented by Iraq's incontestible (and brutal) act of
aggression and to restore the violated territory to its rightful rulers. Though not stressed for a variety of reasons-but clearly present-the potential threat to the world economy posed by Iraqi
control over the region's oil resources played a major part in the
United States' subjective justification of war. Later, Mr. Bush
would add the need to "remove" an evil tyrant (who, not too long
before, had been a valued friend) to the list.
On balance, it would seem that the coalition claims outweighed those of Iraq by a wide margin. Not completely though.
The justice of a cause can be vitiated by provocation, and Kuwait's
unwillingness to negotiate a settlement could be seen-in that
light-as provocative. To that extent, the determination of the
United States and the coalition to maintain the status quo in the
Persian Gulf might not be justified if that status quo itself repreI See Detlev F. Vagts, InternationalLaw in the Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 661,
663-65 (1990); see also Harold J. Kearsley, Shadow of Versailles Lies Across Gulf Victory,
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 5, 1991, at 18 (analogizing role of West and former Soviet Union in
arming Saddam Hussein "to the teeth" during his war against Iran to role of United States,
Britain, and France in imposing Versailles Treaty on post-World War I Germany).
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sented, as many would be prepared to argue, an unjust exploitation
of the region's valuable oil resources. Finally, the United States
might bear some of the responsibility for helping to create in Hussein the threat he finally became. All of these are factors to be
considered, though even taken together it is doubtful that they
would be enough to justify Iraq's brutal invasion.
The same imbalance holds with respect to the "right intention" condition. Hussein simplified evaluation on this scdre by
playing Hitler, making it clear that his intention was to keep what
had been taken by incorporating what had been independent Kuwait as a province of Iraq. The proclaimed intention of the United
States and its coalition partners was the restoration of violated international order (under authority of U.N. Security Council resolutions). Here too, Mr. Bush muddied the clarity of that otherwise
laudable intention with his nebulous and rather disconcerting talk
of creating "a new world order" (which, let us not forget, was also
one of Hitler's stated intentions).
Traditional interpretations of the "just war" theory stress "the
restoration of peace" as the essential "right intention." Here, too,
the U.S./U.N. coalition had the advantage with repeated assertions
that Hussein, not the Iraqi people, was the enemy. The assertions
were coupled with assurances that every effort would be made to
limit the effects of war upon the Iraqis. Hussein, on the other
hand, went out of his way to demonstrate that he was indeed the
villain his opponents made him out to be with his threats to unleash "the mother of all wars." Hussein crossed the line between
secular and moral ethics by declaring his to be a "holy" war.
On these two counts, then, even allowing for possible imperfections in its claims, the U.S./U.N. coalition seems to present the
more compelling case. From this point on, however, matters get
more complicated.
The second cluster of conditions-the specific objectives
through which the "right intention" is to be fulfilled; the legitimacy of the authority under which those actions are taken; and
whether war was the "last resort"-do not depend solely on the
subjective perspective of the combatants. Nations not directly involved and the "judgment of world opinion" must be factored in
by the secular ethicist in evaluating the justice of a given war.
7 See George Bush, The Possibilityof a New World Order, VITAL
May 15, 1991, at 450, 450-52.
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Thus, though either or both parties to a conflict may convince
themselves that war was the only choice, that their actions were
proportionate to the ends sought, and that they had the full and
unchallenged right to act as they did, they may encounter disapproval from non-participants who do not agree. If the disapproval
is serious enough, the participants may be obliged to modify their
actions accordingly.
On the question of "legitimate authority," for example, it can
be argued that in the limited application of the secular ethics perspective, Saddam Hussein has a stronger case than President
Bush. As a totalitarian ruler (even a "tyrant"), there is no doubt
that Hussein had the authority to do what he did, reprehensible
though it might have been in terms of more democratic values.
One might question, of course, whether the total control Hussein
possessed should be held by anyone; unfortunately, there are
enough examples of such unchallengeable power and authority (including, for instance, the rulers of Kuwait, the victim, and Saudi
Arabia, our principal ally) that content-neutrality must prevail.
With respect to President Bush's actions, however, serious
questions can be raised about the legitimacy of his exercise of warinstigating authority. These questions relate to sending troops to
Saudi Arabia (with the misleading assurances that it was a purely
defensive move with no prospect of military action), and to the
equally arbitrary increase in those forces which greatly enhanced
the probability of involvement in conflict. These moves by President Bush are susceptible to contrary interpretation of the legitimate scope of presidential prerogative and were reached with an
obvious and presumably intentional avoidance of any meaningful
consultation with Congress.8
The crucial point, of course, is that no declaration of war was
sought or obtained. Even when hostilities became imminent and a
deadlined ultimatum had been issued, it appeared for a time as if
Congress would be excluded from any participation. Eventually,
the President did, with obvious reluctance, submit the issue to the
Senate which, after extensive debate, reluctantly approved. Even
with that approval, however, it can be argued that Congress's con8 See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 220 (4th ed. 1991).
"Constitutional language suggests that the president and Congress share the war power, the
dominant authority being vested in the legislature. Congress declares war .... The president, the constitution provides, is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces." Id.; see
also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, art. II, § 2.
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stitutional authority and responsibility were ignored as the Gulf
War was added to the growing list of "undeclared wars"-Korea,
Vietnam, Grenada, Panama-and, in the absence of appropriate
constitutional mandate, constituted an illegitimate exercise of
presidential power and authority.'
That the circumvention was accomplished with congressional
concurrence in the guise of approving the enforcement of U.N. resolutions does not "legitimize" the action. The U.N. facade was itself a carefully structured and patently hypocritical sham if one
considers the bargaining, the diplomatic pressure-even bribery-involved in the Administration's determination to persuade
the Security Council to adopt the resolutions in the first place.
From that point forward, the President and his Secretary of State
could and did take refuge in pious declarations that the U.S.
armed forces were merely "fulfilling" the U.N. resolutions that the
United States had authored and imposed upon the international
body. Nothing, however, can obscure the fact that the war was instigated, directed, and (except for token contributions by some of
the coalition partners) fought by U.S. forces under U.S. command.
As the Secretary General of the U.N. would note, had the Gulf
War been a U.N. action, General Schwarzkopf would have been
wearing a blue helmet.
The manipulation and hypocrisy involved may not be enough
to vitiate the claim that the war was fought under "legitimate authority," but there should be enough doubt to justify study and
debate for future ethicists. This should include an evaluation of
the President's insistence upon substantial financial contributions
from "coalition" partners to cover the expenses (prospective
human casualties not included in the tabulation) of the military
action. To some, this insistence carries troublesome implications;
perhaps our men and women in uniform became, in effect at least,
mercenaries (which, as it happened, was how some of the Kuwaiti
elite who spent the war in luxurious exile regarded them).
The second condition in this cluster, "proportionality," measures the range and extent of actions taken to serve the "just
cause" and to demonstrate the "right intention" claimed in legitimation of the conflict. Though often the most difficult to deter' Contra Jim Hoagland, Desert Storm Ticktock, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1992, at A27.
"Contrary to the impression spread by critics of Bush as an imperial president eager to run
roughshod over Congress, Bush is shown here resisting appeals from Cheney (a former congressman) and Scowcroft to ignore Congress' war-making powers." Id.
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mine, it is again easily disposed of as far as the Iraqi side of the
Gulf War is concerned. Hussein's promises of unrestrained mayhem proved beyond his competence to fulfill, but there is little reason to doubt his readiness to do whatever he felt was useful to gain
his ends. Allowance must be made, of course, for his claim that he
was fighting a "holy" war, in which case the limits and restrictions
normally associated with the concept of proportionality would be
superseded by the unrestrained mission of fulfilling Allah's will.
U.S.IU.N. coalition military plans and performance were more
in keeping with the idea of proportionality though in actual practice they, too, fell short in some respects. Certainly there were no
threats of "all-out war" to match Hussein's, and it is probably safe
to say that some of the coalition partners would have objected
strongly to any such suggestion. Indeed, had the sanctions worked
to the Bush Administration's satisfaction (as some of the partners
apparently felt they were working), one can assume active hostilities would have been avoided altogether. This might have disappointed some of our military planners eager to test the effectiveness of their weaponry and strategies, but a casualty-free victory
would probably have been welcomed by the President and Congress alike.
This is where, at least as far as U.S. actions are concerned, the
proportionality condition fuses with the remaining condition in
this second cluster, the requirement that war be the "last resort,"
that all other-avenues of recourse must be tried and must have
failed before war becomes a legitimate option. President Bush's insistence upon issuing ultimatums and setting deadlines before giving the economic sanctions ample opportunity to bring Hussein (or
a much-desired successor) to the bargaining table may have been
simple impatience. If so, the Gulf War would constitute a violation
of the "last resort" condition. If, as may have been the case, there
were pressing reasons for his impatience, this would bear more directly on the proportionality test. In the last analysis, resort to war
may have been a violation of both.
Because the sanctions unquestionably were having effect, it
should follow that they had not been fully "tried" and most definitely had not "failed." Under the circumstances, then, recourse to
armed hostilities was premature and unjustified. However, there
were reports of presidential concern that the coalition which had
been so laboriously constructed might not hold; as the cost of
maintaining the sanctions mounted, it was feared that some of its
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members who did not share President Bush's personal animosity
toward Hussein might weaken in their commitment to the cause
and possibly even withdraw. Then, too, the likelihood that several
months, and perhaps more than a year, would be required before
the sanctions would have their full effect and impact brought political considerations into play. The risk that Americans could become edgy at the prospect of involvement in another unpopular,
long-range confrontation could pose a serious threat to the President's hopes for re-election in 1992; this unhappy prospect may
have put pressure on Bush and his advisors to "get the job done"
without waiting for the sanctions to accomplish their purpose. If
either was the case, the choice of a certain evil (the death and destruction actual hostilities would certainly bring) to avoid such potential and hypothetical inconvenience would not only be a de
facto violation of the principle of proportionality but a blatant disregard of the "last resort" requirement as well.
Thus "Desert Storm," speedy and thorough military victory
though it may have been, was at best an ethically dubious shortcut to fulfilling the objectives set forth in the claims to a "right
intention." Its failure to achieve an acceptable peace or even the
desired removal from power of Saddam Hussein (the restoration of
Kuwait's undemocratic rulers was its only real success) is magnified by the grim events of the war's aftermath. Indeed, as already
suggested, with the death toll and social disruption continuing to
mount with little hope of early resolution, it may be misleading
and much too early to even speak of "aftermath."
Which brings us to the third, and final, condition: for a war to
be just it must be "just" in its conduct. As is often-perhaps, in
modern warfare always-the case, both sides failed to meet that
test. In its initial phase, Iraq's successful aggression against its
smaller neighbor, there was nothing in Hussein's rhetoric or behavior that manifested the slightest intent to adhere to or even acknowledge the limitations imposed by customary "rules" of warfare. If, once the broadened conflict was in progress, his muchfeared introduction of chemical or bacteriological weapons did not
materialize, this probably reflected an inability to follow through
on the threat or (more likely perhaps) caution inspired by fear of
reprisal. His missile attacks may not have achieved the results intended, but by using them against urban targets (including targets
in non-combatant Israel) he made it clear that the failure was not
due to ethical restraint. The final touch of torching the Kuwaiti oil
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fields when defeat was already certain bordered on the diabolical.
Unfortunately, as the full facts slowly become known, the
same judgment can be made of certain aspects of U.S. conduct in
the war. Much was made of the professed commitment to discriminate means, illustrated by profuse and highly detailed accounts of
the wonders of the "smart" bombs being employed. Little mention
was made of the fact that the great majority of the routine and
heaviest bombing assaults involved "dumb" bombs, or that many
of their "smarter" relatives suffered unfortunate lapses that
brought them down miles from their targets.
If credit is to be given to the decision to avoid reliance upon
the indiscriminate "carpet" bombings of civilian areas so commonplace in previous wars, new tactics and technologies call for evaluation. For instance, the "earth-shaker" bombs employed against
Iraqi trenches and bunkers represented so great a concentration of
destructive power, psychological as well as physical in their effect,
by literally driving their targets mad, that the ethicist-moral as
well as secular-must ask whether, or to what point, is "discriminate" use of essentially "indiscriminate" weapons permissible, and
under what circumstances does it merit condemnation.
Other ethically dubious "advances" in the strategy and tactics
employed by U.S. forces threatened to test the depth of human
depravity. Consider, for example, plows mounted on massed tanks
and combat earthmovers burying uncounted numbers of Iraqi
soldiers (one figure hints at 8,000) alive in a sweep over more than
70 miles of trenches.' 0 Or the practice of setting the air itself afire
by lowering blankets of incendiary gas that, once ignited, consumes
everything (and, of course, everyone!) below in the resulting fireball." Consider finally the culminating atrocity, the "turkey shoot"
on what has been termed the Highway of Death when the long line
of a defeated army in retreat was blocked off at both ends and
systematically slaughtered by pre-planned and synchronized waves
of bombers. 2 The grandfatherly image of the war's super-hero,
General Schwarzkopf, was weakened by his pouting in public that
10U.S. Thrust Buried Iraqi Troops Alive, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1991, at 79 (citing
Patrick J. Sloyan, Buried Alive U.S. Tanks Used Plows To Kill Thousands in Gulf War
Trenches, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 12, 1991, at 1).
1 Michael Kinsley, Dead Iraqis,NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1991, at 6 (discussing horrors
of "fuel-air-explosive" device).
2 Hollow Victory, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 20, 1992, at 40.
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Secular eththe ceasefire interrupted his "battle of annihilation.'
ics and moral ethics, together with the idealized traditions and
vaunted mystique of "military honor," had always made provision
for permitting and respecting surrender of the vanquished enemy.
But not, it seems, in the Gulf War. The enemy, all too often, was
not given the chance to surrender.
In this, the conduct of the war added further testimony to
what appears to be a troubling tendency for "the American way of
war" to incorporate or favor annihilation, even extermination, as
an acceptable war aim. Increasingly this is reflected in the weapons
and strategies employed. This tendency found its historical origin
in the preferred way of dealing with the Native American population: the only "good Indian" being defined as a dead Indian. In the
Civil War, General Sherman presided over his own "highway of
death" on his way to the sea and expressed little concern about
civilians counted among the victims. War was Hell, in great part
because he made it so. Our more recent history includes the
"butchery of untold magnitude" of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Pope
Paul VI's description) and the excesses of Vietnam, whether measured in the vengeance-crazed slaughter 'of villagers at My Lai or
the more planned and carefully coordinated raids over city and remote hamlet alike. And now Iraq.
Had the U.S. forces stolen a march on Saddam Hussein and
used the bacteriological weapons he threatened but failed to deliver, it would have been recognized and condemned as a crime
against humanity. What they did, however, accomplished much the
same effect. As Manchester's Guardianput it,
the worst civilian suffering was caused not from bombs which
went astray but from weapons which hit the 'right' targets: power
plants, oil refineries, roads and transport on a scale far wider than
Saddam's lines of supply and command. The effect has been compounded since the war by the maintenance of sanctions which hit
hardest at its most vulnerable members - mothers, children and
the sick or deprived. 4
The March 1991 report of the United Nations speaks of "near apoc13 George Church, Keeping Hands Off: As Saddam's Loyalists Pound the Rebels, the

CarnageInside Iraq Poses a Quandary with No Attractive Alternatives for the U.S., TIME,
Apr. 8, 1991, at 22 (in interview with David Frost, "Schwarzkopf said he had recommended
that the U.S. keep fighting, since his troops could have 'made it a battle of annihilation'
that, by inference, would have finished Saddam's regime").
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alyptic results" of the American bombings and concluded that
"most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. ' ' 15 Other reports told of epidemics of typhoid and
cholera in which 55,000 children under five years of age had already died and predicted another 170,000 would die in the coming
year. UNICEF's Middle East Director reported, "You can go into
places like Basra and walk for blocks and blocks almost knee-deep
in liquid sewage.
Certainly these effects must have been anticipated and taken
into account in the planning of the "discriminate," but no less deliberate, destruction of Iraq's infrastructure. What, it is fair to ask,
is the difference between an air assault designed to spread disease
and one designed to create the conditions under which disease is
certain to develop? Again, at what point, the ethicist must decide,
is foreknowledge of effects inseparable from the intention to produce them?
Apparently the military planners have no problem with this.
The Secretary of Defense has been quoted as saying, "If I had to
do it over, I would do exactly the same thing. 17 The principle of
noncombatant immunity, central to the "just war" theory in both
its secular ethics and moral ethics application, was dismissed by a
another senior military officer with the comment, "The definition
of innocents gets to be a little bit unclear. They do live there, and
ultimately the people have some control over what goes on in their
country.""8
An adverse judgment based on the application of secular ethics to the conditions governing the conduct of the Gulf War by
both parties is inescapable. Both were guilty of violating it in
spirit, in intent, and in deed: Hussein and the Iraqi forces in the
brutal aggression against Kuwait and, even more, -in what they
would have done had they been able (and their regret that they
were not); the United States in the excesses actually performed,
excesses clearly planned and intended. Since evils of commission
are always more costly in human terms than evils contemplated
but not performed, the violation is more serious and the guilt
greater for the United States and, by shared responsibility, its coa15The Death Toll, WAR WATCH (OUTNOW, Santa Cruz, Ca.), Sept. 1991, at 3 (quoting
March 1991 U.N. Report).
16 Id.
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lition partners. And the guilt will multiply as the death toll continues to mount. In this sense, it bears repeating, it is premature to
speak of an "aftermath" to the Gulf War. A victory, yes, but in
spite of all the yellow ribbons and the celebratory frenzy, probably
not one of which this nation and its leaders will long be proud.
III.
The secular ethicist's final evaluation of the Gulf War on the
basis of the conditions set forth in the "just war" theory would be
"mixed" but more favorable to the U.S./U.N. coalition. At best the
judgment would seem to be that it was "closer to 'just'" on their
part but certainly not "just." The Iraqi cause was clearly "unjust"
in its origin, pursued with no semblance of "right intention" or
concern for the principle of proportionality. It was (again in a
strictly content-neutral sense as far as the character of Hussein's
rule is concerned) conducted under "legitimate" authority-he had
the office, the power, and apparently the acceptance of the Iraqi
population. Once the "Desert Shield/Desert Sword/Desert Storm"
sequence took over, fighting back may have been Iraq's "last resort" but only if one ignores the prior aggression against Kuwait
and the fact that the option of withdrawal was always open. Hussein's conduct of the war, though the weapons and strategy were
not particularly effective, was to be-and here one can take his
rhetoric literally-unhindered by any moral or ethical limits.
Which is not to say that the Bush Administration's war (and
honesty requires it be so designated) came anywhere near meeting
the conditions of the "just war." One can grant the justice of the
cause and the "right intention," namely defending the integrity of
international order and restoring Kuwait's sovereignty, but other
considerations cast doubt upon the purity of those intentions. After all, the rights of other small nations have been violated without
stirring similar indignation and reaction on the part of the United
States, a fact that gives rise to the legitimate suspicion that the
Gulf's oil reserves may have carried at least as much weight as
Kuwaiti rights in the President's deliberations and decision.1 9 As
" One might go beyond this to suggest that this obvious selectivity testifies more to
long-standing policies serving or protecting narrow national interests than to high-minded
dedication to international order and peace. For example, Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer cites a

1948 statement of goals issued by George Kennan on behalf of the State Department's planning staff, recognizing the disparity between the United State's share of the world's wealth

(50%) and its share of the world's population (6.3%).
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already noted, too, there is reason to question whether the constitutional distribution of checks and balances was given due consideration and respect in the initiation and waging of war; and the
deception involved in cloaking an arbitrary presidential decision
with the semblance of U.N. authority may have hindered, rather
than added, to the legitimacy of his subsequent actions.
The Gulf War clearly was not a "last resort" but rather the
product of Mr. Bush's impatient refusal to allow U.N.-approved
sanctions a fair test. This in itself would violate the principle of
proportionality-no more harm to be done than is necessary-and
this violation was confirmed in the nature and scope of actions
taken by the armed forces. The speedy outcome was, of course, to
be welcomed if only for humanitarian reasons, yet it also testified
to the gross inequality of the contest and the excesses perpetrated
by the victorious "superpower" upon a clearly outclassed opponent. In the process of displaying that awesome disparity, the conduct of the war was such that it violated reasonable standards of
justice. The horrors Hussein undoubtedly would have committed
had it been within his power to do so may have been equalled by
the United States, with token participation on the part of its coalition partners. Indeed, when the final accounting is made, they may
have been surpassed.
Though the focus here has been upon the "just war" theory as
related to secular ethics, these conclusions would also affect those
Catholics and other Christians who accept it as the basis for a
moral ethic of war. If they begin (as the 1983 pastoral letter of the
U.S. Catholic hierarchy said one must) with the Scriptural pre5 (1989). As defined by Kennan, "Our real task [becomes one of maintaining] ...this disparity without positive detriment to our national security." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Low INTENSITY WARFARE: COUNTERINSURGENCY, PROINSURGENCY, AND
ANTITERRORISM IN THE EIGHTIES 48 (Michael T. Klare & Peter Kornbluh eds., 1988)). This
forces a policy choice between "altruism and world-benefaction," which requires the United
States to "dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming" and to "cease to talk about
vague and ...unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards and
democratization." Id. (alteration in original).
Kennan's conclusion that "[t]he day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in
straight power concepts," id., finds striking elaboration in the 1988 Report of the Defense
Department's Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, which calls for a strategy
fitting together "our plan and forces for a wide range of conflicts, from the lowest intensity
and highest probability to the most apocalyptic and least likely." REPORT OF THE DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT'S COMMISSION ON INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY 1 (1988) (Fred C.Ikle &
Albert Wohlstetter co-chairs). Seen in this context, Saddam Hussein's villainy may have
masked the very real possibility that the war against Iraq was merely a stage in a continuing
program of keeping overly ambitious Third World countries "in their place."
AGAINST THE POOR
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sumption against violence in applying the theory's conditions as
set forth in that document, 20 a fair judgment would be that all the
conditions were violated at least by implication and, in most cases,
explicitly.
The misfortune, of course, is that such application and evaluation is seldom, if ever, made in time of war and moral judgment is
left to future studies (which are never made). In the case of the
Gulf War, this pattern was broken by a number of bishops who
openly denounced the war as unjust and actually advised the faithful not to take part, even at times giving active support to young
Catholics who took that advice-many of whom, one must note,
have been subjected to severe punishment by military
authorities. 2 '
There were, of course, other bishops-usually of greater prominence-who adhered to the traditional pattern of automatically
endorsing obedience to the secular power in time of war,22 but the
impact of this was undercut by the public statements opposing the
war emanating from Pope John Paul II in Rome.23
Theologians, too, were divided on the issue, but if a census
were taken of those who took a position, the majority probably followed the usual course of cautious support for the war with occasional reservations. Most surprising (and disappointing) to this
writer was the statement of one of the most respected theologians,
Father Avery Dulles, chiding the bishops for not leaving the determination of the war's justice to military and political leaders in
their professional capacity.
It is small comfort, perhaps, but the fact that different positions were publicly expressed (especially by bishops!) gives promise
that the theory of the "just war" and its relevance, if any, to war as
it is fought today is now an open question among moralists. There
is reason to hope a more serious effort will be made to explore and,
perhaps, rediscover the nonviolence and pacifism that characterized the actions and the teachings of the early Christians. This will
20 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE at iii (1988)
2' Gordon C. Zahn, Prisonersof

[hereinafter

NATIONAL CONFERENCE].

Conscience, U.S. Style, AMERICA, Nov. 16, 1991, at 361.
22 Little has been heard from these bishops, however, with respect to the conduct of the
war and, in particular, its tragic and continuing effects.
22 Silvio F. Senigallia, Reality Rears Its Head in Italy: A Cause for Concern, NEW
LEADER, Feb. 11, 1991, at 8 ("John Paul I's relentless denunciation of the Gulf War, his
apocalyptic warnings, and his apparent refusal to make any allowance for armed self-defense, shocked secular opinion and greatly surprised Vaticanologists.").
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not, of course, determine the course of secular ethics but it may
inspire its practitioners to join the moralists in a broadened search
for the better answers to questions related to war and peace that
must be found if the tragedy of the Gulf War is not to be repeated
over and over, world without end.
The most pressing of these questions is whether, given the nature of modern war, its weaponry, and its strategy, war can be justified at all; whether, that is, the fulfillment of all the other conditions could outweigh the excesses that have become intrinsic to its
conduct.2 4 If only a hundred hours of combat can produce deaths
numbered in the hundreds of thousands and after-effects that assure that grim total may well be multiplied several times over, it
becomes a mockery to speak of justice or, for that matter, reason.
If the horrors of the Gulf War, once they sink into our consciousness, help to awaken us to that fact-but only if it does-it may
yet accomplish some good. My hopes on this score, I confess, are
faint.

24

One religious leader of some prominence has already made such an assessment and

voiced his judgment. In his homily at the Coventry airport, Pope John Paul H said, "Today,
the scale and the horror of modern warfare-whether nuclear or not-makes it totally unacceptable as a means of settling differences between nations. War should belong to the tragic
past, to history; it should find no place on humanity's agenda for the future." NATIONAL
CONFERENCE,

supra note 20, at 68-69.

